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Preface 
 
A major Japan-British Exhibition was held at the White City, 
Hammersmith, London, for six months in 1910. Its centenary 
was celebrated at a conference in the Suntory-Toyota Centre in 
association with the Japan Foundation on 15 June 2010. 
Specialists in the subject gathered to re-assess the impact it 
had made on the various cultural and commercial aspects of 
Anglo-Japanese relations. 
 
The conference papers are to be published independently. But 
this study which deals more broadly with Japan’s attempt to 
improve her status in the international community around this 
time by influencing journalists, academics and exhibition-goers 
is being issued separately.  
 
The STICERD International Studies series has previously 
included a discussion paper by Dr Ayako Hotta-Lister on the 
related theme of ‘The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1911’ 
[IS/02/432, April 2002]. 
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MEIJI JAPAN’S ASCENT TOWARDS WORLD POWER 
 
Ian Nish 
 
[Talk given at the Japan Foundation, London, 17 June 2010] 
 
A number of academic conferences were held during 2010 
to celebrate and re-assess the Japan-British exhibition which 
had taken place at the White City, London between May and 
October 1910. A prime objective was to establish Japan’s 
purpose in taking the initiative in this elaborate cultural-
political exhibition and contributing the major part of the 
items on display. The question is especially intriguing as 
Japan’s economy, because of heavy government debts and 
large-scale imports to feed her rapid industrial development, 
was in a perilous state and hardly well-placed to fund an 
expensive exhibition in a far-off land. What sort of image was 
Japan trying to project? Allowing for the fact that one object 
was commercial, what message was Japan sending in the 
cultural and educational field?    In this paper we try to look 
at the steps which successive Japanese governments were 
taking to bring their achievements to the notice of the British 
in the first decade of the 20
th
 century, culminating in her 
involvement in this grand London exhibition. (1) 
 
 
Although they were a modest people, Japanese have not 
been slow to seize any opportunity to show off the progress 
of their own country. The government from the Vienna 
International Exhibition onwards was a regular participant in 
world exhibitions; and individuals sometimes took the 
initiative to show off their society. One of the latter was the 
Japanese Native Village in Knightsbridge organized by 
Tannaker Buhicro-san (as he liked to describe himself) in the 
1880s. This has been chronicled by Hugh Cortazzi in Japan 
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in Late Victorian London: The Japanese Village in 
Knightsbridge and the Mikado, 1885. (2)  It still lingered in 
the British memory. Thus, one observer wrote in 1910: 
 
 ‘Many minds will travel back to the middle of the 1880s 
when a certain modest little show was held in 
Knightsbridge with its first object-lesson in things 
Japanese, and the reminiscence will give them 
occasion to reflect upon the extraordinary change that 
has come about in the relation of Japan to the rest of 
the world during a momentous quarter of a century.’ (3)  
But this commercial enterprise had focused on Japan’s 
primitivism and exoticism. It was therefore timely that the 
cultural as well as the commercial developments in the New 
Japan since 1885 should be drawn to British attention. 
 
 
One pressing reason for a new initiative was Japan’s worry 
that the Anglo-Japanese alliance which had been signed in 
January 1902 was deteriorating in the eyes of Britain.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
The Japanese leaders evidently thought – though they were 
much too polite to say so – that the British people were then 
very ignorant about Japan and what knowledge they had 
was very superficial.  There was some justice in this 
conjecture because the alliance was a government-to-
government alliance rather than a people-to-people one. The 
people did not really understand much in depth about Japan. 
Their ideas were influenced by Gilbert and Sullivan comic 
opera, ‘The Mikado’, and they were unaware that it was 
intended as a commentary on contemporary British politics 
rather than an accurate portrayal of Japan. There was a 
good case, therefore, for ‘educating’ the British people about 
Japan, her art and commerce, and for investing considerable 
sums to that end. 
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This had led in the early years of the century to Japanese 
efforts to publish some basic information about their country 
and its institutions. These were independent publications 
from acknowledged publishers in Britain rather than official 
handouts. But their contents kept close to government and 
the Japanese who took part as authors were politicians and 
establishment figures.   
Suematsu Kencho, The Risen Sun, London, Constable, 
1905; 
Okuma Shigenobu (edited), Fifty Years of New Japan 
(assisted by Marcus Huish), London: Smith & Elder, 1910 
(2 volumes) 
Henry Dyer, Dai-Nippon, The Britain of the East: A study 
in National Evolution, Glasgow: Blackie, Sept. 1904 
James Murdoch, History of Japan, vol. 2, 1903, vol. 1, 
1910, London: Kegan, Paul, Trubner 
Arthur Lloyd, Every-day Japan, London: Cassell, 1909 
[Introduction  by Hayashi Tadasu] 
This is a diverse list of substantial publications produced 
over the decade mainly by British people who had 
experience of Japan. Was there a publishing mania at this 
time, induced by the alliance, by the war with Russia or 
Japanese subsidy? It could be that there was a perceived 
appetite for Things Japanese which British publishers sought 
to fill but it is hard to explain why. There was hardly a major 
London publisher which did not join the bandwagon. 
Evidently they felt that there was a readership for these 
works. But there may have been some positive prodding by 
the Japanese government. (4)  
 
Even at an intellectual level, Japan was wanting greater 
exposure for her proud achievements. Thus, intellectuals like 
Hasegawa Nyuzekan, the eminent critic and journalist, wrote 
that the nation’s bold progress in modernization during the 
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Meiji period and its more recent military victories over Russia 
entitled Japan to improved recognition among the nations of 
the world. There was a general consensus among them that 
Japan was not adequately appreciated abroad for her 
achievements; the objective should be to persuade 
foreigners of Japan’s success in matching western learning 
with her oriental traditions and improve their understanding 
of it. (5) 
 
 
In Britain at a popular level, it would appear that the war with 
Russia in 1904 induced a new sort of enthusiasm for Japan 
in marked contrast to the hatred for Russia. Thus the music 
hall song of the day spoke admiringly of the Japanese 
exploits: 
 
‘Only a little Jappy soldier,  
Only a duty done 
Wounded and bleeding and dying 
Just when the battles won. 
Only a faded floweret 
Only a mother’s tears 
Yet pressed to his heart 
This flower bears a part 
And death loses all its fears’  
 
There was obviously some knowledge here of the 
remarkable spirit of sacrifice for country and empire which 
Japanese soldiers were displaying. The reputation which 
Japan had won for her feat of arms in defeating Russia in 
1904-5 created a popular thirst for knowledge about all 
aspects of the country. (6) 
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Yet that was scarcely reflected on the political side. The 
more Japan progressed, the greater the resentment. It was 
the time of the Anglo-Japanese alliance entered into in 1902. 
That alliance had been renewed and revised in 1905, its 
terms being made stronger than those of 1902. But, as we 
look at British motivation thereafter, we find that, since 
Russia dropped out of the equation as a threat to Britain in 
the east, Britain lost some interest in it. When Britain entered 
into agreements with Russia in 1907, Foreign Minister 
Hayashi complained that Japan had not been consulted and 
that the alliance was now regarded as second best. The 
British foreign secretary denied that there had been any 
change in the British government’s enthusiasm for the 
alliance. (7) Successive Japanese ambassadors in London 
observed this coolness in their reports and were doubtful 
about Britain’s true attitude. They confirmed what one British 
paper was to write in 1910: 
 
‘We cannot ignore the fact that if the alliance between 
Great Britain and Japan were proposed for the first time in 
the present year of grace it would meet with opposition 
both more widespread and more definite than 
that....encountered when making the experiment a decade 
ago.’ (8)  
 
Clearly doubts were emerging about the true British feeling 
towards the Japanese alliance.  
 
 
Evidently something more dramatic than publications was 
needed in order to restore goodwill. Ambassador Komura 
Jutaro (1906-8) felt that the need might best be met by an 
exclusive exhibition involving Britain and Japan. Unlike other 
European capitals, London had never hosted an Oriental 
exhibition on an extensive scale. It was assumed that there 
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was a public eager to know something about Japan; and 
there was one entrepreneur, Imre Kiralfy who, having taken 
on the task of arranging the Anglo-French exhibition (1908), 
was prepared to assume the wider responsibility for 
organising a Japanese exhibition, whose logistic problems 
were bound to be much greater than those connected with 
France. (9) 
 
The purpose of this essay is to interpret the Japan-British 
exhibition of 1910 against the background of Japan seeking 
to win recognition among the powers and her deserved 
reputation. The fullest account of the exhibition is given in 
the authoritative study by Dr Ayako Hotta-Lister; and we 
shall avoid trespassing on her account by writing about the 
periphery rather than the exhibition itself.  Without becoming 
concerned with the nitty-gritty of the exhibits which were 
painstakingly assembled in London, we shall concentrate on 
the standpoint of British journalists, academics and others in 
the run-up to the ultimate exhibition.  
 
PERSUADING JOURNALISTS 
 
From early 1900s British publishers met the wish of the 
Japanese government to produce some basic information 
about their country. We know something of the origins of one 
of these books: Alfred Stead, a British journalist, was invited 
to Japan in 1903 in order to arrange and edit a compendium 
of articles written by prominent Japanese. His object was to 
foster ‘a better and fuller understanding of the country and its 
people’ (preface xi). The book of some 700 pages under the 
title of Japan by the Japanese came out in the summer of 
1904 after the war with Russia had begun.  One of its major 
contributors, the ever-ungaggable Count Okuma Shigenobu, 
set out the nation’s objects thus: 
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‘The principle of attaining an equal footing with the 
Powers was …. the motive that has enabled Japan to 
become a nation advanced in civilization and respected 
by the world’ (10)   
 
When war broke out in 1904, the Japanese were pessimistic 
about the hostility they would face from European 
governments. They therefore resorted to a clutch of policies 
presenting Japan’s case in lectures and books, trying to 
steer, and even control, foreign newspapers and, more 
generally, conducting through legations and consulates 
abroad a sort of ‘diplomacy by publicity’ (koho gaiko). These 
policies which largely affected the foreign press are 
associated with the missions of Baron Kaneko Kentaro to US 
and Baron Suematsu Kencho to Europe. Their special 
activities have been comprehensively studied by Professor 
Matsumura Masayoshi, in his recent book. Suematsu, a 
comparatively senior statesman who came to Europe to 
present Japan’s case for going to war gave well-attended 
lectures which were generally welcomed by British and 
continental journals into their columns. (11) 
 
Sir Claude MacDonald, Britain’s envoy in Tokyo (1900-12), 
was confident about the alliance in its strategic-military 
aspect but felt that ‘the tone of all English newspapers bar 
one is bitterly anti-Japanese’. When he reported that he had 
witnessed increasing British disillusionment with Japan to 
the Japanese leaders, Ito and Prime Minister Katsura took 
the trouble to give him assurances about Japan’s future 
intentions. (12)  
 
But even The Times which MacDonald had highlighted as 
being pro-Japanese, was not unanimous. The Japanese 
were wise to cultivate its goodwill but may have exaggerated 
its influence over opinion. The mixed reception which Times 
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journalists gave to Japan is illustrated by its far eastern 
experts: Valentine Chirol of its far eastern desk and Frank 
Brinkley, Tokyo correspondent, who took a genial attitude 
towards Japan and its continental policies. On the other 
hand, George Ernest Morrison, the Peking correspondent 
who carried equal weight with them and had an international 
reputation, had become deeply suspicious of Japan’s 
conduct in Manchuria and especially over railway projects in 
Manchuria. He shared the title of ‘Our Correspondent in 
China’ with JOP Bland, a well-known Treaty Port trader and 
publicist. This caused confusion. There appeared in The 
Times on 13 and 27 February 1909 two articles which were 
highly critical of Japan’s role in the Fakumen railway project 
under the by-line of ‘Our Peking Correspondent’. This 
condemned the ‘steady refusal of Japan to extend her own 
railway system for the development of the rich regions of 
Manchuria.’ This attack caused an immediate outburst of 
wrath from the Japanese government and press against 
Morrison who was already well-known for his anti-Japanese 
views. But it appeared that he was for six weeks in Shanghai 
attending the International Opium Conference in Shanghai 
when they appeared and was not responsible for the 
offensive messages which were probably written by Bland. 
(13) 
 
Encouraged by Ambassador Kato, Chirol was about to 
embark on a journey to Japan in April 1909 as part of a far 
eastern tour such as he had earlier made in his career in 
1895. Morrison was instructed by the Times management to 
join him there. He admits that he was insincere in his reply 
that he was ‘delighted’ to do so. He set off by the established 
route, Newchwang, Dairen, Port Arthur, Shimonoseki and 
Kobe, reaching Tokyo on 24 May and staying briefly at the 
British embassy. (14)  
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The pair drew much public attention in Tokyo. The 
International Press Association held its general meeting at 
the Imperial Hotel, Tokyo, on 29 May. Chirol and Morrison 
were guests of the evening alongside Ito, Katsura, and 
Henry George.  In the company of Chirol, Morrison was 
granted an audience with the Emperor Meiji, an 
unprecedented honour for international journalists. He 
cleared up with the Japanese authorities that he had no 
direct responsibility for the Fakumen articles but was not 
present when Chirol was received by Prime Minister Katsura 
and Vice Foreign Minister Ishii and had the policy of Japan 
explained to him. He had an interview with Ishii Kikujiro who 
deputized for the indisposed Komura; but he had taken over 
as vice-minister so recently that Morrison did not think that 
he had grasped the China problem. (15) Morrison was not 
appeased by the special hospitality which Japan laid on 
during his visit: ‘Boredom and lies. Back and changed into 
frockcoats.’ He further disagreed with the ‘joint’ telegram of 
30 May which conveyed to London Chirol’s pro-Japanese 
conclusions about the discussions they had jointly held. After 
a sojourn in Yokohama he wrote in his diary, ‘Japan forgets 
that, if she treated British subjects in Japan with a little more 
justice and consideration much of this bitterness against her 
– now steadily if not rapidly growing – would cease.’ (16) 
 
The two continued their return journey through Korea and 
Manchuria to Peking. But Chirol failed to convert his 
travelling-companion and they parted in a state of mutual 
antagonism which was to continue until Morrison left The 
Times in 1912. The Tokyo embassy reported perceptively 
that the Japanese 
 ‘knew of course that Chirol was their friend and hoped to 
win Morrison over but the latter is a tough nut to crack and 
isn’t so easily won’. (17)   
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INFORMING ACADEMICS 
 
The task of wooing and convincing British journalists had 
only been partially successful. But it appears that Japan also 
wanted to bring to the notice of British universities the 
reforms which it had introduced in politics and public 
education since 1890 of which it was proud. 
 
It was at the London School of Economics (LSE) and in new 
disciplines like sociology and politics that Japan’s experience 
was most relevant to higher education in Britain. The LSE 
and the University of London had benefited from the Martin 
White benefaction which promoted the study of comparative 
sociology. Under its auspices the LSE invited Lafcadio 
Hearn, an Irishman educated partly in Britain, to give a 
course of eight public lectures on Japanese civilization in the 
summer term of 1904. Hearn, a man of letters, had spent a 
long career teaching in Japan, ending up as Professor of 
English Language and Literature at the Imperial University of 
Tokyo (1896-1903). He had written many novels, short 
stories and travel books which gave an on-the-whole 
romantic view of Japanese civilization and manners. We do 
not know why the LSE was ready to open negotiations to 
establish a lectureship on Japan, the only country at the time 
to be so honoured. Hearn, an unlikely candidate for this 
approach, was gratified by the invitation but confessed 
understandably that he did not like the idea of writing ‘a 
serious thesis on Sociology’. In any case the negotiations 
broke down because of the decline in Hearn’s health which 
led to his death in September 1904. (18) 
 
Okakura Yoshisaburo (1868-1936), the younger brother of 
the author Okakura Kakuzo (sometimes Tenshin), was also 
approached. Kakuzo had deliberately set out to educate the 
west about Asian, and especially Japanese, culture and was 
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already well-known for his publication The Book of Tea. 
Yoshisaburo was an experienced professor and exponent of 
the English and Japanese language in his own right. The 
LSE Director’s report states that under the Martin White 
benefaction ‘Mr Okakura, a learned Japanese visiting the 
country, delivered three lectures on the Spirit of Japanese 
Civilization to a large audience’ in 1905. The lectures were 
later published with an introduction by George Meredith 
(1828-1909), the celebrated novelist, who had taken the 
chair. He took up one of the controversies of the day and 
declared 
‘concerning the foolish talk of the Yellow Peril, a 
studious perusal of the book will show it to be fatuous’. 
(18) 
The Yellow Peril doctrine was the notion promoted by the 
Kaiser that Japan after her successes would join with a 
populous China to create trouble for Europeans. It caused 
the Japanese a great deal of worry. The public rejoinder by 
Meredith and Okakura dismissing the notion was therefore 
valuable for Japan. (19)  
 
 
The wartime euphoria for all Things Japanese passed. In the 
post-war period countless points of discord arose. The 
Japanese seem to have wanted to appeal to the literate 
classes to overcome this perceived unpopularity. The 
University of London arranged for a series of lectures to be 
given by Dr Sawayanagi Masataro but he returned home 
without delivering them. Hayashi Tadasu, the former 
ambassador in London who had returned to Tokyo to 
become foreign minister, invited Baron Dr Kikuchi Dairoku 
(1885-1917) to undertake the assignment in the easter and 
summer terms of 1907.  Kikuchi had been Hayashi’s 
contemporary in Europe in the 1860s. This choice was 
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readily endorsed by Makino Shinken who was serving as 
education minister.  
 
Baron Kikuchi had been educated at Cambridge and 
become Emeritus Professor of Mathematics and president at 
the Imperial University of Japan in Tokyo. He had 
additionally acted as education minister in the aftermath of 
the Textbook Scandal of 1903 where publishers were shown 
to have conspired with officials 
in charge of the textbook market to secure a monopoly in 
sales. Kikuchi implemented reforms whereby textbooks 
should henceforth be strictly supervised by ministry 
inspectors. He was later to become president of the Japan 
Academy, 1909-17. (20)  
 
Kikuchi gave a prestigious course of 15 lectures on 
‘Education in Japan’ under the Martin White endowment. He 
presented the case for educational policies which were at 
once progressive and conservative. Progressive reforms had 
been adopted for several years after 1905 but there was also 
stronger central government control. His main message was 
the general one that there had been a remarkable 
intellectual movement in the middle of the Tokugawa period 
which was reflected in the high educational standard of the 
Japanese common people; while there was a willingness to 
learn from abroad, there were progressive trends in the 
domestic education of primarily samurai families, always 
within the context of Buddhism, Confucianism and Shinto. 
This was a corrective to the western notion that school 
education had been neglected in Japan’s feudal past. (21)  
 
Kikuchi also lectured along similar lines to the Royal Society 
of Edinburgh on 17 June 1907 regarding ‘Japanese National 
Development especially with reference to Education’. (22) 
He received honorary doctorates from Glasgow and 
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Manchester universities. He was bold enough to speak at 
the Manchester High School for Girls on the subject of 
women’s education.  He took a conservative line: “the 
vocation of woman is to be wife and mother; we demand it of 
our women that they shall be ‘good wives and wise mothers’ 
(ryosai kembo)”. While opportunities for schooling had 
greatly increased in the past decade, there were still only 
limited facilities for the higher education of girls. This 
message may not have gone down well. (23)  
 
The willingness of Edwardian society to learn about Japan is 
further illustrated by the experience of Uehara (George) 
Etsujiro, a graduate of Washington State University who 
came to LSE under the supervision of Graham Wallas from 
1907 to 1910 and completed a thesis on contemporary 
Japanese politics. This won him the coveted Hutchinson 
Silver Medal in 1910. He obtained the degree of D.Sc. 
(Econ.) from the University of London. It was a rare event 
because doctoral degrees by thesis had only been 
introduced by London University from 1903 onwards and, 
even then, largely in the field of economics and economic 
history. To write about contemporary politics, including the 
Treason Trials of 1909, so soon after the event was bold for 
the author and his supervisor. The thesis was published as 
one of the London School of Economics Studies in 
Economics and Political Science. (24) It was an 
encyclopaedic work, describing the remarkable progress of 
his country, both political and economic, which he attributed 
to its determination to defend itself from the marauding west; 
while Japan was still a state in transition, it represented a 
practical synthesis of autocracy and democracy. LSE wanted 
to offer Uehara an appointment as a specialist in Japanese 
government. But the talks broke down and Uehara returned 
to Japan, becoming an academic. He was to be one of the 
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organisers of the Sydney and Beatrice Webbs’ visit to Japan 
in August 1911. (25)  
 
APPEALING TO EXHIBITION-GOERS  
 
While these initiatives in the field of journalism and higher 
education were taking place, Japan was embarking on the 
planning for a larger and more costly venture, the holding of 
the Japan-British exhibition in London in 1910. Ambassador 
Komura had promoted the idea and was its driving force. His 
successor, Ambassador Kato, had his hands full with other 
business and seems to have left the arrangements very 
much to the individual initiatives of Mutsu Hirokichi, the 
embassy counsellor who became Exhibition Commissioner, 
and the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce rather than 
the Foreign Ministry. (26)  
 
The exhibition had ill luck from the start, with bad weather 
and the death of King Edward VII. It had always been 
assumed that it would operate under royal patronage. Prince 
Fushimi Sadanaru was the royal patron along with Prince 
Arthur of Connaught. Baron Oura Kanetake who was 
minister of agriculture and commerce in the Katsura cabinet, 
was the politician responsible on the Japanese side. As 
president of the Japanese commission for the Exhibition, he 
was able to absent himself from cabinet for over five months 
- a mark of the importance attached to the exhibition. His 
counterpart on the British side was the Duke of Norfolk.  But 
despite this aristocratic patronage, the exhibition suffered 
from the king’s death. 
 
 
Unfortunately several serious examples of Anglo-Japanese 
disagreement arose during the time of the festival. One was 
the  intense commercial opposition to Japan’s 
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announcement in January that she proposed to scrap 
existing tariffs and introduce on a reciprocal basis a 
conventional tariff with selected countries, not including 
Britain. Another was Japan’s annexation of Korea in August 
which led to widespread public protest. (27) A third was the 
reporting of the controversial High Treason Trial of 1910 
[Taigyaku jiken] dealing with the cases of those suspected of 
planning the assassination of the Emperor.  Ambassador 
Kato was very worried about the lengthy coverage of the 
High Treason cases that was being carried in the British 
press from May 1910 onwards. Such was the hostility of 
newspapers in US and Britain to the secretiveness of the 
judicial proceedings that British embassy staff in Tokyo were 
(exceptionally) allowed to attend the court proceedings.  The 
fact that the early stages of these trials coincided with the 
exhibition was most unfortunate and detracted from any 
hope Japan had of creating through the exhibition the 
impression of being a progressive modern state. (28) 
 
 
Nonetheless, by the time the exhibition closed its gates, 
8,350,000 British people had flocked to the White City 
despite the atrocious weather at the beginning and the end. 
They seem to have been full of genuine curiosity about 
Things Japanese and interested in the wide diversity of 
Japanese culture which was on display despite logistic 
difficulties. It was not only the experts who came out in 
praise. The majority of British journalists were surprisingly 
positive in their appreciation.  Japan’s spokesman had said 
that it was his country’s ‘hope that this Exhibition may be the 
means of bringing our thoughts into nearer touch, and of 
augmenting our mutual knowledge of one another without 
which, after all, no good relations could hope to stand on a 
substantial basis’. That modest ambition may have been 
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achieved. An English commentator similarly felt that British 
people had much to learn on a personal basis: 
‘The home-keeping Englishman has even yet nothing but 
a very hazy notion of the yellow man....The English public 
will be struck by other characteristics of these Oriental 
[workers at the London exhibition] – their industry, their 
courtesy, their calm inquisitiveness, their impassive and 
inscrutable air of detachment. We cannot doubt that by 
the end of the present summer... [the British people] will 
have begun to think in a somewhat different way of our 
Far Eastern allies.’ (29) 
 
The two sides did not approach the exhibition from a 
common position. Japan played the dominant part in its 
planning and for that reason it was given the name 
JAPANGLO, a name which reflected realistically the 
contribution which she made. She wanted to project a 
favourable image of the country, its administration, history 
and culture. British commerce and industry were happy 
enough to take part provided it was on a limited scale and 
without the need for image-building propaganda. Japan 
obviously had goods of an unfamiliar kind to show, though 
they had of course to be transported half-way round the 
world. British companies were at a different level of 
development from Japan and were displaying manufactured 
goods of a more advanced technological kind. The Japanese 
government made a substantial financial contribution; the 
British government boasted that it had not given a penny. 
The Japanese government made a substantial financial 
contribution; the British government boasted that it had not 
given a penny. But that was a rhetorical half-truth. The 
British exhibits in the science, arts and agriculture sections 
may not have been directly subsidised by the Exchequer but 
they were in effect government-funded.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
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EDUCATIONAL DIMENSION OF THE EXHIBITION 
 
Because it was managed by a commercial entrepreneur, 
Kiralfy, the exhibition was centralized on a single site in 
London. Beyond the bounds of the exhibition site, Japan set 
out to demonstrate the state of Japan’s culture and 
education and civilization, ancient and modern, and augment 
Britain’s knowledge and understanding of Japan. Education 
pamphlets were circulated widely to show how modern 
Japan’s educational methods were. A publication in four 
volumes, Education in Japan prepared for the Japan-British 
Exhibition (1910), was prepared by the department of 
education and circulated separately from the Exhibition. It 
showed how education had flourished throughout the ages 
through the terakoya schools in the period of Japan’s 
isolation, and was not just a modern importation which had 
followed Japan’s acquaintance with the west. More recent 
modernizing reforms had emphasized moral, social and 
women’s education. 
 
Associated with this, government handbooks were 
distributed in connection with the Exhibition, some being 
specially translated for the occasion. These covered mining, 
agriculture, fisheries, commerce and industry, forestry, 
customs houses and the judicial system. Regional volumes 
also covered the Kwantung territory in Manchuria, the colony 
of Taiwan and Tokyo municipality. (30)  
 
The Japanese commissioned The Times to issue a 
Supplement for the Japan-British Exhibition of 1910, a 
complicated appendix to the newspaper which only 
appeared in July, two months after the exhibition opened. It 
consisted of bureaucratic pieces with sections written by 
Times correspondents and other well-known authors in the 
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Japan field. It covered some 70 pages of the standard size 
of The Times broadsheet of that period.  It was later 
republished in more lavish form as a reference book in hard 
covers. It is an accurate, informative and comprehensive 
publication, written with privileged access to Japanese 
government sources. As to its origins, The Times is known to 
have sent its representative to Japan 
in 1909 in order to prepare the way for the Supplement; but 
whether the initiative lay with the newspaper or the Tokyo 
government is not clear. (31) 
 
Not unexpectedly the Supplement contained an influential 
article by Baron Kikuchi. He repeated the same conservative 
message which he had earlier given to an Edinburgh 
audience: Japan set out deliberately to introduce western 
civilization but was ill-equipped for the task and had to try to 
keep intact the Japanese spirit, the fundamental character of 
our nationality. (32) He wanted, he said, to undermine the 
existing British misconception that the Japanese had a 
merry, easy-going life-style. On the contrary, the Japanese 
had been deeply grounded in education in the past and this 
equipped them to cope with modernization along western 
lines. In a sense this was one of the broader messages 
which Japan’s representatives tried to put across in 1910.  
 
It was dangerous for the Japanese government to use a 
single British newspaper to produce a supplement. It left 
both the government and the newspaper open to criticism. 
The fact that Japan in its advertising favoured The Times did 
not pass unnoticed by its jealous newspaper rivals. The story 
created a lively controversy towards the end of the 
exhibition. Soon after Dr Morrison, The Times correspondent 
in Peking, arrived in London on furlough in August, he 
commented: 
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‘The Times has lost much credit by its publication of the 
Japanese supplement, towards which the Japanese 
government contributed £10,000. If such subsidy had 
been kept secret, it would not have done so much 
injury, but as  every man in England who takes an 
interest in these things, knows not only of the subsidy 
but of its amount, the injury to its prestige is obvious.’ 
(33) 
Lord Stanhope, an obstreperous member of the House of 
Lords, proposed to make political capital out of the issue by 
criticising ‘the negotiations in regard to the Japanese 
number’. But Morrison sought to dissuade him from making 
a fuss on the grounds that 
‘The payment made by the Japanese Government was 
understood to be on behalf of various enterprises, 
banks, railways and merchant houses, whose 
advertisements in the ordinary course would have to be 
paid for. Japanese Government undertook to make the 
payment en bloc and were then to recover the amount 
from the different Societies [Sources?] whose 
advertisements appear in the paper.’(34) 
The explanation that the Tokyo government was merely 
acting as a collecting agent was accepted at face value and 
a public political storm was averted. Still the acceptance of 
such a large sum by The Times was regarded as damaging 
to its reputation. It was not, however, abnormal in Japan at 
the time – and by no means unknown in Britain either. (35)  
 
Much less controversial was Mochizuki Kotaro’s 
encyclopaedic work, Japan Today, also published to 
coincide with the London Exhibition. It consisted of about fifty 
essays about Japanese life and society, selected by the 
Japanese editor.  It was defensive and apologetic about 
some of the common criticisms made by foreigners about 
Japanese life. His arguments were 
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‘It is hoped these explanations will dispel any false 
conceptions and show how well woman was 
appreciated and treated by men.’ 
‘Under the heading Bushido we have shown how the 
manly character of Japan was built up under the 
educational influence of that peculiar idea.’ 
 
  
The Exhibition closed on 29 October. Throughout there had 
been an emphasis on exchanges of work between Japanese 
and British schools and schools’ handiwork was put on 
display. Winding up the education programme, the London 
County Council offered to display specimens of students’ 
work on education in Japan. These were viewed at Birkbeck 
College, London, in the early days of 1911 at the time of a 
teachers’ conference there. This was typical of Japanese 
attempts to make the exhibition broader than the site of the 
White City itself. When the fun of the fair there had died 
down, there was left over a vast amount of instructive 
material, a bonus for British libraries, museums and gardens. 
This generosity was prompted by the notion that the goodwill 
created should be carried forward and there should be an 
ongoing continuity of understanding. 
 
It is almost impossible to generalize about whether 
international exhibitions are a success or a failure. By their 
very nature they are many-sided (commercial, cultural, 
political) and, while some parts may be successful, others 
can be failures. In the case of the 1910 exhibition this is 
reflected in the warm references made by the organizers and 
the pious remarks made at its closing ceremonies contrasted 
with the many voices of dissent from critics. Comparatively 
favourable coverage in British newspapers was contrasted 
with many criticisms on the Japanese side, some 
disappointed at how their national achievements in the 
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previous half-century were presented to the rest of the world 
in 1910.  Tokyo probably took some comfort from the greater 
success it had won in British eyes. It had earlier appealed to 
British journalists and academics, now it had appealed to the 
great British public and achieved a popular success. (36) 
 
x     x     x     x  
 
What was Japan aiming at by this wave of activity which we 
have described? One of the hopes nurtured by Japan was to 
intensify the alliance by stimulating British imports from 
Japan and thus resolve many of the economic hardships 
Japan was suffering in 1908-9.  The alliance should be 
converted into what Mutsu Hirokichi called an ‘alliance of 
commerce’. While Japan was content with the alliance 
politically and diplomatically, 
‘Socially and commercially there is still room for 
improvement. Let then the coming Exhibition serve as a 
colossal seal which will bind us still closer in the 
Alliance of Commerce.’ (37)   
But it was a forlorn hope. There was no enthusiasm in 
Britain, whether the government, the banks or the business 
community, for it to expand into an alliance of commerce. 
Relations were better in the cultural and political fields than 
they were in the commercial. 
 
 
After the 1910 exhibition the British had no excuse for 
ignorance about Japan. If Japanese visitors had only rarely 
been seen in the past, there had been plenty around in that 
year. There was an avalanche of publications in English 
covering the workings of government. Not every publication 
on offer would be read; and the outpourings of Japanese 
bureaucrats were not very glizzy reading. But the material 
was thereafter available for an understanding of Japan, the 
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Japanese people, their institutions and their problem of 
scarce resources. Whether the British people liked Japan or 
not thereafter, their judgments about the country should 
have been better informed. Japan and Britain approached 
the problems of the period with a surer grasp of each other: 
it was a business-like relationship of mutual advantage, two 
allies not always working in unison but pursuing their own 
national interests. For Britain, Japan was no longer a 
Mikado-land, an idea which had been deep-rooted since 
1885. 
 
On 28 October Ambassador Kato at a dinner on the eve of 
the Exhibition closing, said that the object of Japan had been 
to make her allies in Britain understand Japan in her 
commercial, moral and intellectual life: Japan had a high 
level of civilization. As we look at Japan’s purposes during 
this decade, the priority was to win the respect of the outside 
world for her achievements in modernization over the 
previous half-century. Japan thought that these had not been 
adequately acknowledged and had to be shown proudly. 
Here she may have underestimated the admiration of the 
world which was looking favourably on her ‘western 
progress’, but with some perturbation. The second purpose 
was to show that she also had a strong national heritage. 
While adapting her way of life to the rest of the world, she 
was intending to retain elements of her tradition and her 
past. This comes out most forcibly in the writings of Baron 
Kikuchi who, despite his western education and liberal 
approach, was a strong Meiji nationalist, anxious to tell the 
world of Japan’s need to blend the old with new.  
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